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How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA. By Richard Neely. New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 233. $15. 
Although the debate over the proper role of courts and judges in 
a constitutional democracy has raged for decades, no consensus has 
yet emerged. Nor, if the recent literature is indicative,1 have original 
contributions been precluded by the sheer vastness of the existing 
commentary. InHow Courts Govern America, Richard Neely, Chief 
Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, draws on his 
experience as legislator and judge2 and makes a contribution that is 
original in several respects. After exposing the structural deficiencies 
4. Lay readers will find Wishman's careful and simple description of criminal justice and 
procedure to be a refreshing look at the court system. 
1. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); 
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Liti-
gation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
2. Neely views this work as a reflection of his own experiences as a legislator and appellate 
judge. He dispenses with footnotes as "redundant" for the scholar. P. xiv. In the text itself, he 
makes few references either to other theories or to analyses that support his argument. 
Neely would have improved his somewhat wandering arguments ifhe had discussed these 
other theories or analyses. At times the text degenerates into strings of anecdotes, with digres-
sions on the Reagan economic plans, pp. 71-72, democracy in the third world, pp. 139-44, and 
the importance of a liberal education, pp. 223-26. 
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of the executive and legislative branches, he argues that politically 
active courts make democracy work. The institutional deficiencies of 
the other branches can produce undemocratic tendencies, such as 
bureaucratic power grabbing. By offsetting these tendencies, policy-
making courts preserve our democracy. Courts, therefore, should 
make public policy and do so openly. Neely's conclusions are not 
new, but his often cynical, street-wise perspective leads him to some 
interesting arguments for judicial activism. 
Neely's analysis begins with legislatures. These bodies, he notes, 
are slow and cumbersome. Bicameral structures, numerous commit-
tees, and powerful committee chairmen often combine to delay and 
defeat proposed legislation even before the bills reach the floor for a 
vote. Because well-funded special interest groups can block or force 
passage of specific measures, legislatures can reach undemocratic re-
sults. Popular measures might never pass, while unpopular policies 
win legislative approval (pp. 47-68). These indictments of popular 
assemblies, of course, are not novel.3 But Neely's explanation of the 
reasons underlying the defects in the legislative process is intriguing. 
That process, he argues, is consciously designed to offset the power 
of special interest groups. Legislators want to kill as many bills as 
possible without voting. More votes of record, even for popular 
causes, would subject each legislator to almost certain defeat because 
of the sheer number of special interests offended (pp. 54-58).4 Legis-
latures will remain cumbersome, Neely asserts, because legislators 
want them to be cumbersome (p. 56). 
Perhaps because his experience lies primarily in the legislature 
and the judiciary, Neely's analysis of the executive branch is less in-
sightful. Any bureaucracy, he argues, seeks power and influence (p. 
102),5 and will engage in overreaching conduct to attain those ends. 
Elected officials, moreover, cannot restrain or control the enormous 
bureaucracies nominally at their disposal (p. 80). The President and 
Vice-President, for example, are the only elected officials supervising 
the millions of federal executive employees. As a result, the execu-
3. Political scientists have discussed these defects for years. See, e.g., W. KEEFE & M. 
OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 484-87 (1968); Heard, Reform: Limits and Op-
portunities, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 154 (A. Heard ed. 1966). Legal 
theorists, in analyzing judicial activism, have also noted these defects. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, 
supra note 1, at 16-25, 38-45. 
4. Others have noted these undemocratic features without explaining why they exist in 
almost all American legislative bodies. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 1. Keefe and Ogul, 
noting the inability of legislatures to pass popular measures, have suspected that procedural 
complexity is used to shield legislators from voting on the record. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, 
supra note 3, at 484 n.14. Neely's insight lies in treating these features as systemic rather than 
aberrational in nature. 
5. Neely refers those who would desire a more detailed analysis to other writers. See J,K, 
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); C. REICH, THE GREENING OF 
AMERICA (1970). 
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tive branch, in contrast to the legislature, tends to be overly active (p. 
113). 
His analysis of the executive and legislative branches leads Neely 
to two conclusions. He argues· first that an activist judiciary per-
forms a valuable balancing function: Activist courts can offset the 
institutional defects of the other branches of government. Courts 
can make policy where the legislative process has broken down, and 
restrain public agencies where the elected officials have not. Judges 
should thus try to reach the results that the democratic institutions 
would reach if they worked :flawlessly (pp. 113-14). 
Neely then refers back to his institutional analysis to suggest con-
ditions under which courts should play this demo~racy-enhancing 
role. He concludes that judicial power is not unlimite'd and ~ttempts 
to present criteria that courts can apply openly. Drawing on his ex-
perience on the bench, he argues that courts should intervene where 
(1) the general good, as opposed to a special interest, is at stake; (2) a 
majority of the public agree on the desired objective, but institu-
tional defects have frustrated this majority; (3) the beneficiaries of 
the intervention are powerless because of the institutional defects;6 
and (4) the judicial intervention will not force judges to become ad-
ministrators (pp. 77-78, 168, 188-89). It is doubtful that beleaguered 
trial courts will find these vague guidelines helpful. 
The lack of institutional checks on the courts makes the open-
endedness of Neely's guidelines even more troubling. Only if effec-
tive institutional restraints limit judicial power can courts perform a 
democratic balancing function. Without such restraints, judges 
could ignore their theoretical balancing function and impose their 
own political goals.7 But Neely fails to persuade the reader that ef-
fective constraints exist. He argues that because courts are sensitive 
to legislative control of the judicial budget, they will limit their activ-
ism to avoid antagonizing the legislature (pp. 145-49).8 He also as-
serts that a strict code of ethics (pp. 193-96) and a natural desire to 
do as little as possible (pp. 201-02) both discourage judicial interven-
6. This requirement differs from the second requirement. A majority of the population, for 
example, might support increased state aid for poor school districts. Neely would not support 
intervention here, even in the face of frustrating institutional defects, because the beneficiaries 
of the intervention are very powerful. Teachers' groups and the education lobby incessantly 
ask for more aid for eduction. These groups are not the hapless victims of institutional break-
downs. Pp. 170-89. 
7. Lower courts are subject to appellate review. Restraints are needed, then, on appellate 
courts. Professor Choper reduces this problem further by restricting his analysis to the re-
straints on the Supreme Court. See J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 47-59. 
8. Neely admits this budgetary power is less significant at the federal level. Individual 
congressmen cannot accumulate the institutional power to retaliate against judges for deci-
sions. Individual state legislators can gather this power. P. 60 n.2. Furthermore, under United 
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 20Q (1980), Congress cannot reduce the salary of federal judges. P. 
201. 
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tion beyond a balancing role. Neely never explains, however, why 
these checks have not stemmed the tide of judicial activism in recent 
years,9 and thus offers no means to ensure that courts will adhere to 
his proposed guidelines. 10 
Because Neely cannot identify effective institutional restraints on 
the judiciary, his argument that courts make democracy work fails. 
His insights are interesting and should further the debate on the 
proper role of courts and judges, but How Courts Govern America 
does not supply any answers. The book may, as Neely hopes, ulti-
mately be more useful as a "primary source" for other scholars (p. 
xii) than as an attempt to justify judicial activism. 
' 9. In the chapter on judicial restraints, Neely only mentions that courts are asked to solve 
problems today that would not have been brought to courts twenty years ago. P. 202. This 
indirect reference is used to illustrate the increase in the judicial workload; Neely does not 
consider how this increase in workload undercuts his proposed restraints. 
10. In his analysis of the judicial balancing function, Neely implicitly assumes that courts 
can decide when to intervene. Horowitz, in an empirical study, concluded that courts are par-
ticularly unfit to make this threshold intervention decision. Horowitz found courts poorly 
suited to judge the consequences of policy-making, hence poorly suited to decide when to 
intervene. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 257-97 (1977). 
Neely also overlooks the views of others in his analysis of restraints on the judiciary. Pro-
fessor Choper notes that the basic restraints on the Supreme Court are impeachment and con-
stitutional amendment. Neither of these restraints looms large as a practical matter. Because 
of this lack of external restraints, the Supreme Court at times has held to positions that are 
highly unpopular. J. CHOPER, supra note I, at 47-55. 
Others have disagreed with Choper and Horowitz. See Chayes, supra note I, at 1307-09; 
McGowan, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1981). Neely, however, does not attempt to 
refute their arguments. 
